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Abstract: Today, many philosophers write on topics of contemporary interest, such as 
emerging technologies, scientific advancements, or major political events. However, 
many of these reflections, while philosophically valuable, fail to contribute to those 
who may benefit the most from them. In this article, we discuss our own experience of 
engaging with nursing researchers and practicing nurses. By drawing on the field of 
philosophical phenomenology, we intervene in a longstanding debate over the 
meaning of “empathy” in nursing, which has important implications for nursing 
research, training, and practice. However, our intention is not only to introduce and 
discuss this philosophical intervention. Rather, we present this intervention as a 
model for how philosophers might successfully engage with the field of nursing, and 
perhaps with other fields as well, with the aim of effecting positive change in research 
or practice. The article proceeds in five parts. First, we introduce the problem of 
conceptual clarity in nursing and explain why many nursing concepts are still in need 
of refinement. Second, we discuss the origins of the concept of empathy in nursing and 
outline the challenges associated with borrowing theory from other fields. Third, we 
explain how nurses tend to conceptualize empathy today, drawing upon the 
psychological distinction between cognitive and emotional empathy. Fourth, we 
discuss our intervention in this debate and explain how we attempt to resolve existing 
conceptual confusions by developing the concept of empathy from the ground up. Fifth, 
we conclude by briefly reflecting upon some of the challenges of interdisciplinary 





Today, many philosophers write on topics of contemporary interest, such as emerging 
technologies, scientific advancements, or major political events. However, many of 
these reflections, while philosophically valuable, fail to contribute to those who may 
benefit the most from them. In some cases, this is simply because the philosophical 
Fernandez / Zahavi  
Special theme: Philosophy of Care 24 
work is published in a venue that it not widely read by people outside of philosophy, 
including those involved in the events or practices discussed in the work. In other 
cases, the work itself is written in an inaccessible manner, perhaps because of 
unfamiliar jargon, the style of argumentation, or an overreliance on broad abstractions 
rather than concrete examples. 
Philosophers should, of course, have the freedom to develop ideas and engage 
in debates that may be of interest only to those already embedded in their field of 
research. But many philosophers who write on contemporary issues do aspire to have 
an impact upon the world outside of philosophy and even the world outside of 
academia. How one’s work can have this kind of impact is, however, a challenging 
question. Traditional philosophical training tends not to focus, for instance, on the 
challenges of engaging in genuinely interdisciplinary research, much less on the 
challenges of effectively engaging with people outside of academia. 
In this article, we discuss our own experience of engaging with nursing 
researchers and practicing nurses. By drawing on the field of philosophical 
phenomenology, we intervene in a longstanding debate over the meaning of “empathy” 
in nursing, which has important implications for nursing research, training, and 
practice. However, our intention is not only to introduce and discuss this philosophical 
intervention. Rather, we present this intervention as a model for how philosophers 
might successfully engage with the field of nursing, and perhaps with other fields as 
well, with the aim of effecting positive change in research or practice. 
The article proceeds in five parts. First, we introduce the problem of 
conceptual clarity in nursing and explain why many nursing concepts are still in need 
of refinement. Second, we discuss the origins of the concept of empathy in nursing 
and outline the challenges associated with borrowing theory from other fields. Third, 
we explain how nurses tend to conceptualize empathy today, drawing upon the 
psychological distinction between cognitive and emotional empathy. Fourth, we 
discuss our intervention in this debate and explain how we attempt to resolve existing 
conceptual confusions by developing the concept of empathy from the ground up. 
Fifth, we conclude by briefly reflecting upon some of the challenges of 




1. The Problem of Conceptual Clarity in Nursing 
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Before intervening in an existing conceptual debate, it is essential to familiarize 
oneself with the history of the field, including how the field’s conceptual frameworks 
originated and how they are used today. Without this knowledge, it is impossible to 
determine whether or how a philosophical concept might be of value to the field in 
question. 
Modern nursing, understood as the professional practice of caring for those 
who are ill, has a history dating back to the 1800s. However, nursing as an academic 
discipline has a considerably shorter history, with university departments of nursing 
first created in the 1960s. As a new research field, nursing had to quickly establish its 
disciplinary identity. It wasn’t immediately clear, however, where exactly nursing fit 
within the broader university structure. Initially, it might seem that nursing stands 
squarely within the fields of biomedical research. However, the concerns that 
dominated the profession of nursing differed in key respects from the concerns of, for 
instance, biology or organic chemistry. Nursing researchers were fundamentally 
concerned with what it meant to be a nurse and how to effectively interact with and 
care for their patients. As Mark Risjord explains, already “In the 1940s and 1950s, 
nursing education had supplemented the physician’s biological knowledge with 
psychology and sociology. Nursing knowledge had thus grown beyond the boundaries 
of medical knowledge, but there was, as yet, little that nurses could call their own” 
(Risjord 2010, 15). In the decades that followed, nurses sought to establish a distinct 
theoretical foundation for their own discipline. However, at least in the initial stages, 
nurses still aimed to model their research on traditional approaches in the sciences. 
Dorothy Johnson (1959) and Rozella Schlotfeld (1960), for instance, argued that 
nursing as a research field should be able to develop its theoretical foundations 
independently of nursing as a practice. As a result, nursing research was not 
understood as a mere response to practical issues in the field. Rather, it was free to 
establish its own aims, which would in turn shape and influence nursing as a practice 
(Risjord 2010, 15). In opposition to this view, several nursing scholars argued that 
nursing practice should be the primary guide to research. Because practicing nurses 
are experts in their own right, they are capable of identifying practical problems that 
researchers should further investigate and attempt to resolve (Risjord 2010, 15–16). 
 Despite this initial pushback, nursing scholarship, for the most part, 
continued to prioritize theory over practice. In the 1970s and 80s, however, an 
increasing number of nursing scholars expressed their frustrations with the fact that 
nursing theory failed to provide any concrete guidance for nursing practice (see, e.g., 
Hardy 1978; Miller 1985). They argued that a relevance gap had emerged between 
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theory and practice. Jean Watson (1981) as well as Janice Swanson and Carole 
Chenitz (1982) argued that this gap emerged because nursing continued to model itself 
on the quantitative approaches of the natural sciences, which failed to resonate with 
the everyday practices of nursing (Risjord 2010, 28). They suggested that nursing 
should instead draw upon the qualitative approaches pioneered in the social sciences. 
While the social sciences had already had some influence on the theoretical 
foundations of nursing, this new focus on qualitative methods pushed nursing further 
in this direction.1 
 This turn toward the social sciences certainly increased the relevance of 
nursing research for nursing practice. However, some nursing scholars also 
questioned whether nursing should be borrowing theoretical foundations from other 
disciplines in the first place. Would it not be better for nurses to develop their own 
theoretical foundations from scratch—theoretical foundations that were tailor-made 
to the field of nursing? 
One of the main motivations for this move is that the longstanding practice of 
borrowing theories from other disciplines produced what we might call conceptual 
heterogeneity. As Janice Morse and her colleagues explain, early phases of a new 
scientific field, such as nursing, are often ripe with conceptual confusion. On the one 
hand, “similar theoretical explanations often compete for preferred acceptance, while 
allied concepts vie to account for the same phenomenon”, producing a situation in 
which different concepts are used with similar and overlapping meanings (Morse et 
al. 1996, 254). On the other hand, “one concept may have several definitions; and in 
some cases, these various meanings may be implicit, unrecognized by researchers and 
clinicians, resulting in a lack of clarity that makes nursing a soft science—or at least 
softer than is desirable” (Morse et al. 1996, 254). This lack of conceptual clarity 
undermines scientific research, including the potential for such research to effectively 
guide or influence practice. 
In response to these conceptual confusions, a considerable amount of 
intellectual labor has been devoted to adapting, refining, and applying concepts to the 
field of nursing. This intellectual work is typically achieved through what nurses call 
“concept analysis” (which differs from the philosophical approach called “conceptual 
analysis”). Nurses employ a variety of methods for concept analysis. Regardless of 
the method, however, the primary aim is to bring a concept to “maturity”. An 
immature concept is one that is poorly defined, often because the boundaries of the 
 
1 For a more detailed overview of the history of nursing as a science, see Risjord (2010 Chs. 
1 and 2). 
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concept have not been adequately articulated, resulting in substantial overlap with 
other concepts. Through various methods of analysis, researchers attempt to develop 
and delineate a concept, ideally to a point where it is measurable or can be reliably 
used in scientific studies or in clinical practice. In some cases, this is achieved by 
constructing a model case to which the concept can be legitimately applied, then 
reviewing apparently related or otherwise illegitimate cases that help refine the 
meaning of the concept.2 Other approaches rely on extensive analyses of how the 
concept has been used in the existing literature. And still others may examine how the 
concept is used in measurement tools or in clinical applications, or even how 
practitioners describe the concept in qualitative interviews. 
Concept analysis was especially popular in the 1980s and 90s. Throughout this 
period, we find analyses of key concepts that are central to the nursing profession, 
such as caring, coping, dignity, empathy, grief, health, hope, privacy, and suffering. 
Most of these concepts were borrowed from other disciplines and then, in some cases, 
modified or adapted for use in nursing. Morse and her colleagues argue, however, that 
many of these analyses were overly simplistic. The descriptions and definitions 
produced by various methods of concept analysis did little to advance nursing 
knowledge (Morse et al. 1996, 225). In our opinion, these analyses often provide an 
excellent overview of the diversity of definitions associated with what at first appeared 
to be a coherent concept. But few of these analyses manage to develop or refine the 
concepts in a meaningful and lasting way. 
 
 
2. The Origins of Empathy in Nursing 
 
After this general overview of how nursing’s concepts originated and developed, we 
are now able to identify a key concept in nursing that might benefit from philosophical 
clarification. Because of its central and longstanding role in the field of nursing, we 
have decided to focus on the concept of empathy as a potential target.  
Nurses, by and large, agree that empathy is key to effective nursing practice. 
But, even today, there’s no consensus on how to define it. The term is used in a variety 
of ways in the nursing literature, referring to a range of perceptual, cognitive, affective, 
and behavioral phenomena. As used within this literature, the concept often overlaps 
with related terms, such as sympathy, care, or compassion. Because of this lack of 
 
2 For more detailed accounts of this approach, which are called Wilsonian or Wilson-
derived methods, see Wilson (1963), Walker and Avant (2018), and Rodgers (2000). 
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consensus, empathy, as used within nursing, remains an immature or partially 
developed concept. 
 Like most concepts in nursing, empathy was originally borrowed from other 
disciplines. One of the original influences on nursing’s conceptualization of empathy 
came from Carl Rogers’ work on therapeutic empathy. Rogers, a well-known 
psychotherapist, was invited to give the keynote address at the American Nurses 
Association in 1957. In his address, he introduced his concept of therapeutic empathy, 
which he initially defined in an overly simplistic way: “To sense the client’s world as 
if it were your own, but without ever losing the ‘as if’ quality—this is empathy” 
(Rogers 1957, 99). However, he soon elaborated the concept as follows: 
 
The state of empathy, or being empathic, is to perceive the internal frame of 
reference of another with accuracy and with the emotional components and 
meanings which pertain hitherto as if one were the person, but without ever 
losing the ‘as if’ condition. Thus it means to sense the hurt or the pleasure of 
another as he senses it and to perceive the causes thereof as he perceives them, 
but without ever losing the recognition that it is as if I were hurt or pleased and 
so forth. If this ‘as if’ quality is lost, then the state is one of identification. 
(Rogers 1959, 3:210–11) 
 
Here, we see Rogers specify his concept of empathy in a bit more detail and begin to 
differentiate it from related concepts—in this case, the concept of identification. Over 
his career, Rogers reworked his concept of empathy and, at times, became critical of 
his early definitions. However, it was his early conceptualization that initially had a 
major influence on nursing. 
 Despite the initial positive uptake of Rogers’ work, some nursing scholars 
eventually became critical of his concept of empathy, in part because it originated in 
an outside discipline. Morse and her colleagues, for example, argued that Rogers’ 
concept of therapeutic empathy was specifically developed to help understand the 
relationship between a psychotherapist and her client. This kind of relationship differs 
in important respects from the relationship that a nurse is supposed to develop with 
her patient. For instance, while it’s important for the nurse to understand a patient’s 
experience, such as how they feel about a recent diagnosis or an upcoming procedure, 
she may not need to develop the kind of rapport that facilitates a successful 
psychotherapeutic intervention. Considering this, Morse and her colleagues 
recommended that nurses devote more energy to developing their own unique 
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theoretical foundations and concepts, rather than borrowing concepts from other 
disciplines that are often an imperfect fit for nursing: 
 
Nursing as a profession is perhaps more unique than we have previously 
recognized, and this uniqueness has both advantages and disadvantages. One 
of the disadvantages is that we must develop our own practice (including our 
own interventions) cautiously and wisely rather than mimicking the 
therapeutic strategies of other professions. Conversely, the development of 
unique nursing theory and practical knowledge must be considered an 
advantage and essential as we develop as a distinct discipline. (Morse et al. 
1992, 279) 
 
Borrowing theory from other disciplines may appear to be a productive shortcut to 
establishing the conceptual foundations of a new field. However, such adaptations 
come with the risk that the theory or its concepts simply aren’t a good fit, either 
because they refer to an irrelevant phenomenon or because they characterize this 
phenomenon in an unproductive way. 
 We think that Morse and her colleagues’ concern is germane, but that it needs 
to be qualified. Not all disciplines develop their concepts in the same way. When 
nurses adapted Rogers’ concept of therapeutic empathy, they took the concept from 
another applied discipline: psychotherapy. Because Rogers developed his concept 
with the aim of better understanding the relationship between psychotherapist and 
client, he didn’t necessarily intend his conceptualization of empathy to be broadly 
generalizable. If his concept of therapeutic empathy functions well in other disciplines, 
this is, in a sense, accidental. 
 But this problem holds only for applied disciplines. Consider, for instance, 
the concepts developed in philosophy or theoretical psychology. Concepts developed 
in these more theoretical disciplines tend to be generalizable. The psychological 
concept of short-term memory, for instance, isn’t intended to clarify what it’s like for 
a particular kind of person to remember (e.g., what it’s like for a waiter to remember 
an order). Rather, the concept is meant to identify a general feature of human 
experience, which is characteristic of all human beings. These fields often develop 
concepts that are meant to help us better understand general aspects of human 
existence, rather than particular issues or situations that apply only to some subset of 
the population. 
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 Considering this, nursing scholars have at least two conceptual strategies: (1) 
Develop concepts from scratch that consider the distinctive or even unique aspects of 
nursing; (2) adapt broadly generalizable concepts from more theoretical disciplines. 
 
 
3. Empathy in Nursing Today 
 
By and large, it seems that nursing scholars have opted for the second strategy. Most 
concepts in nursing are still adapted from other fields. But today these concepts tend 
to be derived from theoretical rather than applied fields. We consider this to be a 
positive development. But adapting concepts from theoretical fields has its own risks 
that we need to consider. There is certainly less reason to be concerned over whether 
these concepts will apply to a particular field since they are intended to be broadly 
generalizable. However, one needs to be certain that the generalizable concept 
accurately characterizes the phenomenon that it is intended to help us understand. If 
the concept mischaracterizes the phenomenon, then it may provide an inadequate or 
misleading foundation when adapted by more applied disciplines. 
This is precisely our concern with the concept of empathy as used in 
contemporary nursing. Today, nursing scholars tend to rely on a key conceptual 
distinction that they borrowed from psychology. This is the distinction between 
cognitive and emotional empathy. Cognitive empathy is defined as the ability to 
understand the other’s experience through higher-level intellectual processes, such as 
imaginative perspective taking, critical thinking, or inference. In the nursing literature, 
it’s sometimes referred to as “state” or “clinical” empathy (although these terms are 
sometimes used with a slightly different meaning). This concept of empathy has 
received particular attention in the literature on nurse education since it is often 
assumed that cognitive empathy is a learned skill that can be trained or developed. 
 This is contrasted with emotional empathy, which is typically characterized 
as the innate capacity to understand the other by sharing their emotional experience. 
Some nurse scholars suggest that this kind of empathy might also be trained (e.g., 
Alligood and May 2000), but this is a minority position. However, the inability to train 
emotional empathy is not the main reason that nurses typically appeal more to 
cognitive than to emotional empathy. The primary concern is that, if emotional 
empathy produces understanding only by sharing the other’s feelings, then this may 
eventually become overwhelming in the clinical setting and lead to burnout. The 
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emotional toll, for instance, of understanding a patient’s distress by taking on the 
feeling yourself may outweigh any benefits. 
 This criticism of emotional empathy extends beyond the field of nursing. The 
psychologist Paul Bloom argues that, in the field of health care, patients want to be 
treated by clinicians who understand them through cognitive empathy but aren’t 
overwhelmed by emotional empathy. He says, 
 
As I write this, an older relative of mine who has cancer is going back and 
forth to hospitals and rehabilitation centers. I’ve watched him interact with 
doctors and learned what he thinks of them. He values doctors who take the 
time to listen to him and develop an understanding of his situation; he benefits 
from this sort of cognitive empathy. But emotional empathy is more 
complicated. He gets the most from doctors who don’t feel as he does, who 
are calm when he is anxious, confident when he is uncertain. (Bloom 2014) 
 
Considering the opposition to emotional empathy in nursing and psychology, it may 
seem that the conceptual confusion that plagued the nursing literature throughout the 
1980s and 90s is largely resolved: Emotional empathy should be avoided in nursing 
practice whereas cognitive empathy should be trained and developed so that nurses 
can better understand and care for their patients. 
In our view, however, the distinction between cognitive and emotional 
empathy rests on a misunderstanding about how we initially come to know or 
understand another person. It is certainly the case that we can cognitively understand 
another by using techniques such as imaginative perspective taking. And there might 
be cases where feeling as someone else feels helps us better understand them. 
However, both cognitive and emotional empathy rely on a more fundamental 




4. A Philosophical Intervention 
 
How do we come to know and understand others in face-to-face encounters? On the 
proposal currently under consideration, either by using intellectual processes that rely 
on imagination, reason, and inference, or by affectively sharing the other’s mental 
states. If, however, we turn to phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, 
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and Max Scheler, who were among the first to develop a proper philosophical account 
of empathy at the beginning of the 20th century, they all offer a different answer. On 
their view, empathy at its most basic—in the following called basic empathy—is a 
perceptually based form of interpersonal understanding, one that more complex and 
indirect forms presuppose and rely on. This is why they often used the term “empathy” 
interchangeably with terms such as “other-experience” or even “other-perception” 
(Husserl [1931] 1960; Scheler [1923] 2008). As Scheler famously writes, 
 
[W]e certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with another 
person’s joy in his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with his 
shame in his blushing, with his entreaty in his outstretched hands, with his love 
in his look of affection, with his rage in the gnashing of his teeth, with his 
threats in the clenching of his fist, and with the tenor of his thoughts in the 
sound of his words. If anyone tells me that this is not ‘perception’, for it cannot 
be so, in view of the fact that a perception is simply a ‘complex of physical 
sensations’, and that there is certainly no sensation of another person’s mind 
nor any stimulus from such a source, I would beg him to turn aside from such 
questionable theories and address himself to the phenomenological facts. 
(Scheler [1923] 2008, 260)  
 
On their view, one can obtain an acquaintance with the other’s experiential life in the 
empathic face-to-face encounter that is direct and immediate (Fernandez and Zahavi 
2020b). 
Here is a concrete example: If you notice a patient suddenly tense her muscles 
and start hyperventilating when you are about to give her an injection, you 
immediately perceive the patient as being afraid of the needle. Under normal 
circumstances, you don’t need to infer such experience from the precise configuration 
of the other’s facial muscles, posture, or breathing pattern, nor do you need to engage 
in some elaborate process of imaginative perspective taking where you attempt to put 
yourself in the patient’s shoes to conclude that she must be afraid. At the same time, 
you didn’t need to share her fear of the needle to perceive the patient’s fear. Rather, 
we simply perceive bodily movements and gestures as expressive of desires, 
intentions, emotions, attitudes, and so on. It’s only in cases where we perceive the 
meaning of someone’s expressive behavior as ambiguous, or we otherwise have some 
reason to doubt our immediate understanding, that we turn to other cognitive or 
emotional techniques for making sense of others. Empathy, according to the 
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phenomenologists, gives us the experiencing other directly, non-inferentially, as 
present here and now (Stein [1917] 1989, 7). But there will always and by necessity 
remain a difference between that which I am aware of when I empathize with the other 
and that which the other is experiencing. Empathy is consequently not about me 
having the same mental state, feeling, sensation, or embodied response as another, but 
rather about me being experientially acquainted with an experience that is not my own. 
Empathy targets foreign experiences without eliminating their otherness. In empathy, 
I am confronted with the presence of an experience that I am not living through myself. 
To empathically grasp another’s fear is not to be fearful oneself, but to recognize the 
joy as belonging to the other. This is why phenomenologists have standardly rejected 
proposals according to which empathy should entail that the other’s experience is 
literally transmitted to me or require me to undergo the same kind of experience that 
I observe in the other. Following on our example above, when I perceive the patient 
as afraid, I perceive the fear in her. I may, in reaction to her subjective state, become 
afraid, surprised, or concerned; but it’s not my feeling that provides me with an 
understanding of the other. We only feel the way that we do because we already 
understand the other as being in a particular state.  
 In reply to claims made by both Bloom and some nursing researchers (e.g., 
Morse et al. 1992) that empathy can hinder clinical care because the sharing of the 
patient’s affective states might be overwhelming and lead to burnout, one might 
consequently argue that the very identification of empathy with affective sharing is 
based on a misunderstanding. This, at least, would be the view of the 
phenomenologists. Empathy, correctly understood, is an immediate, intuitive 
perception of the other’s mental state, which does not require that one share this state. 
Nurses should not, therefore, be wary of relying on this kind of intuitive empathic 
understanding.  
Providing an alternative conceptualization of empathy is, however, only the 
first stage in our philosophical intervention. As we mentioned above, one of the 
challenges of borrowing concepts from more theoretical disciplines is that it may not 
be immediately apparent how they can be usefully applied to a new field. This is 
certainly the case with the concept of basic empathy. If empathy is as basic as the 
phenomenologists claim, isn’t it then something that nurses not only already use in 
their daily interactions with colleagues, patients, and family members, but also 
something so fundamental and automatic that it is entirely outside of their control? If 
a nurse cannot help but experience his patient through basic empathy, then why do we 
need to say anything about it at all? 
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We argue that empathy might be direct, immediate, and automatic, but is still 
something that can be obstructed or facilitated in a variety of ways. And it is precisely 
this possibility of obstructing basic empathy that nurses should be concerned with in 
their clinical practice. Consider again the fact that we can employ different strategies 
when trying to understand others. To take a concrete example, imagine a situation 
where you must care for a patient who has become paralyzed as a result of a traffic 
accident. To offer proper care, you need some understanding of how the patient is 
coping with his new life-situation. How can you obtain that understanding? One 
option is to draw on theoretical knowledge. Being deprived of your mobility is likely 
to limit your ability to satisfy your wants and desires and will also force you to reassess 
your life goals, all of which is likely to decrease your quality of life and make you 
distressed if not depressed. Another possibility is to use your imagination and attempt 
to put oneself in the other’s position. By imagining what it would be like for me to be 
paralyzed, I might come to appreciate what it must be like for you. But to seek to 
understand the other on the basis of prior theoretical knowledge or by imaginative 
perspective taking risks violating or doing away with the other’s perspective 
altogether. Imaginative perspective taking, in particular, risks being an imposition of 
one’s own view upon the other; it might in the end be nothing but an attempt to 
constitute the other through projection and fantasy. This danger is well illustrated by 
what has become known as the disability paradox (Albrecht and Devlieger 1999). 
Although external observers often judge individuals with serious and persistent 
disabilities to live an undesirable or even miserable life, when asked, those very 
individuals often report that they experience a good or excellent quality of life. 
Against this background, the clinical relevance of basic empathy, or of what might be 
termed empathic openness, should be obvious.  
Perhaps some might object to this and argue that the only way we can truly 
understand others is by having (or by having had) the same kind of experiences that 
they do. To truly understand what it is like for a woman to give birth, for example, 
one must have given birth oneself. But is that always an advantage? Imagine having 
had an easy birth, and then witnessing a woman who is in a lot of pain because of a 
difficult birth. Will the fact that one has given birth oneself necessarily make one more 
appreciative of her experiences, or might it on the contrary make it more difficult to 
grasp what it is like for her, since one might be inclined to generalize from one’s own 
case and therefore assume that it is probably not as hard as it seems? None of this is 
to deny that imagining what it must be like for the other, i.e., engaging in imaginative 
perspective taking, might occasionally help one appreciate someone else’s experience. 
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But the imaginative exercise supplements the more basic understanding of them that 
you already achieved through your empathic perception. More comprehensive 
accounts of both classical and contemporary phenomenological analyses of empathy 
can be found in Husserl ([1931] 1960), Scheler ([1923] 2008), Stein ([1917] 1989), 
and Zahavi (2010; 2011; 2014; 2017; 2019). But, for now, let us emphasize that the 
direct and immediate character of basic empathy doesn’t entail any claim regarding 
its infallibility. Basic empathy is fallible. Indeed, just as you can be mistaken about 
an object that you perceive, you can be mistaken about a person that you empathize 
with. In the case of misperception, it wouldn’t be right to say that you didn’t have a 
perception at all. Rather, you simply had an inaccurate perception, which is likely to 
be corrected by other perceptions that you have of the same object. In much the same 
way, you can have an inaccurate empathic understanding of the other, which may be 
corrected as you continue to engage with them. 
In light of this understanding of basic empathy—including both its immediate 
access to the other and its potential for fallibility—what actions might a nurse take if 
she finds herself unable to accurately understand her patient? Rather than, for instance, 
trying to imagine her way into the patient’s perspective, she might instead solicit the 
patient’s self-narrative, asking questions that prompt the patient to provide more detail 
or explain their experience in a new way. As a form of encounter that preserves and 
respects the other’s otherness, basic empathy lets the clinician approach the other with 
the requisite attitude of humility; there is still much that they do not understand. A 
central task of the nurse is not to imagine what it must be like to be the patient, but to 
attend to and help the patient find a voice of their own, where they can express and 
articulate their point of view. 
 
 
5. Reflections on Applied Phenomenology 
 
What should one take away from this philosophical intervention? How might other 
philosophers successfully intervene in debates in other fields, including fields that are 
fundamentally oriented toward various kinds of practice? While there are certainly 
aspects of our philosophical intervention that are unique to the field of nursing and 
the debates that we engaged in, we would like to close by reflecting on some of the 
more generalizable aspects of our approach. 
 First, one should consider how each discipline has obtained and refined its 
key concepts. In our case, this task was not as difficult as it might be when engaging 
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with other disciplines. Nursing, as a field of academic research, has a relatively short 
history, so it is comparatively easy to identify when concepts entered the field and 
where they originated from. Other fields, especially those with considerably longer 
histories, may pose a greater challenge. One may, for instance, need to turn to the 
history of ideas to identify the origin and development of a key concept in a scientific 
field. While this kind of work may seem needlessly laborious when one’s aim is to 
engage in a contemporary debate, we believe that understanding how and why 
particular concepts came into use is key to developing an effective philosophical 
intervention. Without knowing where these concepts came from and why they were 
needed, one risks repeating problems that may have been addressed in the history of 
the field. In our case, it was helpful to find that nurses had become warry of borrowing 
concepts from other disciplines due to a concern about a lack of fit. This motivated us 
to clarify the differences between borrowing concepts from applied fields and from 
theoretical fields, which was key to supporting our integration of philosophical 
concepts into nursing. 
 Second, one should consider how a discipline uses its concepts in practice. 
Concepts that are integral to research aren’t always used in the same way by 
practitioners. If one attempts to effect change in practice by engaging only with how 
concepts are used in research, the intervention is less likely to succeed. In the case of 
nursing, for instance, the relevance gap gave us reason to be skeptical about whether 
the empathy debates in nursing scholarship had any effect on how practicing nurses 
engaged with their patients. However, we found that the literature on empathy 
education and training in nursing largely echoed the concerns expressed in the 
scholarly debates. Some articles, for instance, stressed that the ongoing conceptual 
confusion over the meaning of empathy in nursing was a major obstacle to the design, 
implementation, and evaluation of empathy training in nursing programs (see, e.g., 
Brunero, Lamont, and Coates 2010; Williams and Stickley 2010). This gave us reason 
to believe that further clarifying the meaning of empathy might have positive effects 
on training and practice (Fernandez and Zahavi 2020a). 
 Third, and finally, one should demonstrate how abstract concepts can be 
applied by using concrete examples. As we explained above, theoretical and 
philosophical concepts should, in principle, be generalizable. In practice, however, it 
is not always apparent how such concepts apply to a particular domain. One doesn’t 
necessarily need to provide overly detailed examples to illustrate the applicability of 
a concept. Even relatively simple examples can go a long way toward demonstrating 
such applicability, so long as they resonate with the audience and help them see how 
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the concept gears into the relevant context. In our case, we demonstrated how the 
phenomenological concept of basic empathy and empathic openness assuages 
concerns associated with emotional empathy (i.e., that the clinician might become 
overwhelmed by the patient’s feelings) and avoids shortcomings associated with 
cognitive empathy (i.e., that the clinician may project their own experiences on to the 
patient). By providing clear examples of how empathic openness may facilitate 
engagements between clinicians and patients in clinical encounters, we offer a starting 
point for both nursing scholars and practicing nurses to further explore how they might 
put such a concept to use. 
 Philosophy is often characterized as one of the most abstract academic 
disciplines, with little relevance to everyday life or concrete practices. Since its 
inception, however, phenomenology has been a source of inspiration for empirical 
science and the world beyond academic philosophy. Its non-philosophical relevance 
has been part of its enduring appeal and arguably also what has made it so attractive 
to many different disciplines, including that of nursing (Zahavi 2020; Zahavi and 
Martiny 2019). In recent years, however, philosophers from many different traditions 
have become increasingly interested in contemporary issues across a variety of topics 
and fields. To make sure that our intellectual labor does not go to waste, we should 
continue to reflect on how philosophy can engage in relations of mutual enlightenment 
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